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The Battle in Both Courts
NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no "state shall . . . de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law ... "1 Similarly, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,' which Congress enacted
pursuant to its grant of authority by section five of the fourteenth
amendment,' prohibits any person from interfering with another's
federally-protected rights under color of state law. Both the due
process clause, by its express language, and section 1983, by both
its language" and judicial construction,5 apply only to limit actions
attributable to state actors. Unfortunately, however, the Supreme
Court has not provided a clear demarcation between state action,
against which these provisions provide protection, and private ac-
tions to which the provisions do not apply. In fact, a convoluted
body of law, generically labeled as the state action doctrine, lives
in the, United States Reports as testimony to the Court's unsuc-
cessful efforts to draw the necessary line between state and private
action.
Despite the incoherency of the state action doctrine, it is clear
that, at times, a private actor may become so intertwined with a
state actor that the actions of the private actor can be character-
ized as state action.6 However, the already difficult characteriza-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
4. In toto, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
5. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, n.7 (1966) ("in cases under § 1983,
'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action'
required under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
6. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding
that a restaurant leasing space within a public parking facility, as it was in a position of
pervasive interdependence with the lessor state, was itself a state actor).
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tion of a private actor's status is complicated when the private ac-
tor is an organization which includes among its members some
entities which are clearly private actors and others which are
clearly state actors. A poignant example of such an organization,
one whose status has spawned a considerable amount of litigation,
is the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA).
The NCAA is an unincorporated association charged with reg-
ulating a vast amount of the intercollegiate athletic competition in
the United States.' Its members, of which there are approximately
960, include most of the public and private colleges and universi-
ties in the United States that, conduct athletic programs.9 Upon
inspecting the NCAA's roster of members, it becomes quite clear
that many are state institutions and many are not.' Because of
this hybrid membership, the courts have labored for years over
whether the NCAA is a state actor." Recently, in NCAA v.
Tarkanian," the Supreme Court of the United States endeavored
for the first time to clarify the issue when it granted certiorari to
determine whether the NCAA had engaged in state action when it
investigated the basketball program of one of its state actor mem-
bers, the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV), and, as a
result of its findings, subsequently required UNLV to show cause
why UNLV should not suspend its head basketball coach, Jerry
Tarkanian. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that neither the
NCAA investigation nor its recommendation that UNLV suspend
7. For years the lower federal courts have had to determine whether the NCAA is a
private or a state actor. Early on, most courts of appeals found the NCAA to be a state
actor. E.g., Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 434
U.S. 978 (1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. NCAA,
506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. of California State University v.
NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). However, after the Court's trilogy of
state action decisions handed down in 1982-Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co, 457 U.S. 922
(1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982)-most of the lower federal courts have found the NCAA to be a private actor. E.g.,
McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th
Cir. 1987)Y, Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953 (6th Cir. 1986); Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d
1019 (4th Cir. 1984).
8. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 (1988)
9. Id.
10. For example, the University of Florida, the University of Illinois, and the Ohio
State University, like UNLV, are state institutions which are NCAA members. In contrast,
the University of Miami, Duke University, and the University of Notre Dame are all private
institutions that belong to the NCAA.
11. See supro note 7 (documenting the vast amount of federal appellate court deci-
sions deciding the NCAA's status).
12. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
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Tarkanian constituted state action. 13 This Note discusses both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Tarkanian and argues that the
Court was too quick to distinguish Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority 4 which, because of the pervasive interdependence of
UNLV and the NCAA and the mutual benefits each derive from
the relationship, provided a basis for the Court to find that the
NCAA was a state actor.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS
A discussion of the Court's opinion in Tarkanian necessarily
must be preceded by an account of the factual background which
brought the case to the Supreme Court. As noted above, Jerry
Tarkanian is the head basketball coach at UNLV15-a branch of
the University of Nevada, a state funded institution. 6 UNLV is a
member of the NCAA17 and, as a member, had agreed to abide by
and enforce the NCAA's rules governing the conduct of the ath-
letic programs of its member schools with respect to, inter alia,
student-athlete eligibility, admissions, recruiting, and financial
aid.'8 The NCAA employs a Committee on Infractions to enforce
its rules.' 9 The Committee conducts investigations of alleged rule
violations and is empowered to impose penalties upon offenders."0
Particularly relevant in the Tarkanian litigation was the Commit-
tee on Infraction's power to command a member school to show
cause why that member should not incur additional sanctions un-
less it disciplines an employee.2 '
The Committee on Infractions began a preliminary investiga-
tion of UNLV for alleged NCAA violations on November 28,
1972.22 On February 25, 1976, after a three year investigation, the
13. Id.
14. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
15. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457. Tarkanian became a tenured professor in 1977. Id.
16. Id. UNLV "is organized and operated pursuant to provisions of Nevada's State
Constitution, statutes, and regulations." Id. The Court noted that the officers of UNLV,
when acting in their official capacity, undeniably act under color of state law. Id.
17. Id. at 462.
18. Id. at 457.
19. Id.
20. Id. In reality, an NCAA investigation is not conducted by the Committee on In-
fractions. The Committee merely sits as a judicial tribunal. The actual NCAA investigations
are conducted by a full-time, paid enforcement staff. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIc Asso-
CIATION, 1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 355 (1989).
21. Id. at 458, n.7. However, irrespective of this power to force a member to show
cause, it is clear that the NCAA is not permitted to sanction directly an employee of a
member school. Id.
22. Id. at 458.
19891
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Committee informed UNLV's president that an official inquiry was
necessary.23 Specifically, the allegations involved UNLV's recruit-
ment of athletes between 1971 and 1975; some of the allegations
implicated Tarkanian.2 The NCAA requested UNLV to conduct
its own investigation and to provide detailed information with re-
spect to each allegation.2 UNLV complied and, with the assistance
of the Attorney General of Nevada, conducted its own investiga-
tion of the charges.2 On October 27, 1976, UNLV responded to the
Committee by denying all allegations that the university or
Tarkanian were guilty of any wrongdoing.2 7 The Committee on In-
fractions then held several doys of hearings where counsel for
UNLV and Tarkanian presented their findings and challenged the
legitimacy of the NCAA investigation.2 8 Although the Committee
agreed that many of the charges could not be substantiated, it de-
termined that thirty-eight violations of the NCAA rules did occur,
ten of which were committed by Tarkanian.2
The Committee recommended several sanctions against
UNLV, including a two-year period of probation for the basketball
program.30 Further, the Committee asked UNLV to show cause
why "additional penalties should not be imposed against UNLV if
it failed to discipline Tarkanian by removing him completely from
the University's intercollegiate athletic program during the proba-
tion period." 31 UNLV appealed most of the Committee's findings
to the NCAA Council, which, on August 25, 1977, rejected the ap-
peal and adopted all the Committee's recommendations.3 Soon af-
ter UNLV received the NCAA ruling, university officials held a
hearing to determine whether UNLV would adopt the sanctions."
At the hearing, UNLV's vice president outlined UNLV's three pos-
sible options: (1) UNLV could reject the sanction requiring
Tarkanian's suspension and risk heavier sanctions; (2) UNLV
could reassign Tarkanian-despite his tenure and the lack of no-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. The Court said the most serious violation was Tarkanian's failure to fulfill
UNLV's obligation to fully cooperate with the NCAA investigation. Id. at 458-59.
30. Id. at 459. Under the terms of its probation, UNLV's basketball team would not be
allowed to participate in post-season games or appear on television. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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tice-because of the recognition that UNL" had delegated power
to the NCAA to act as the ultimate arbiter in these matters; or (3)
UNLV could pull out of the NCAA completely.3 4 Choosing the sec-
ond option, UNLV's president notified Tarkanian that he was to
be "'completely severed of any and all relations, formal or infor-
mal, with the University's Intercollegiate athletic program during
the period of the University's NCAA probation.' ,35
On the day before he was to be suspended officially, Tarkanian
filed suit in a Nevada state court. seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against UNLV, alleging that UNLV, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983, had deprived him of liberty and property without
affording him the due process of law required by the fourteenth
amendment.3 6 Reasoning that Tarkanian had been deprived proce-
dural and substantive due process, the trial court enjoined UNLV
from enforcing its suspension.37 UNLV appealed."
In the Nevada Supreme Court, the NCAA filed an amicus cu-
riae brief contending that the suit should be dismissed because
there was no existing controversy between Tarkanian and UNLV;
in the alternative, the NCAA argued that if there was a contro-
versy, the NCAA was a necessary party to the litigation." The Ne-
vada Supreme Court found that a controversy existed between
UNLV and Tarkanian, but concluded that the NCAA was a neces-
sary party to the litigation and remanded to permit joinder."'
Upon remand, Tarkanian amended his complaint to include
the NCAA as a defendant."1 Finally, after four years, and a two
week bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of Tarkanian, con-
cluding that the NCAA's conduct constituted state action and that
its decision was arbitrary and capricious.-2 The trial court reaf-
firmed its previous injunction which had prohibited UNLV from
suspending Tarkanian and, after Tarkanian's subsequent filing of a
petition, for attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988,"' granted
34. Id.
35. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 70, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061)).
36. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459. For a full discussion of the lower court decisions, as
well as the NCAA investigation of UNLV and Tarkanian, see State Action & the NCAA:
Will Tarkanian Sport the Old Look?, 4 ENT. & SP. L.J. 385 (1987).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 460.
40. University of Nevada v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 594 P.2d 1159 (1979).
41. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (allowing a court in its discretion to award a party prevail-
ing in a § 1983 action a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the costs).
1989]
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Tarkanian a total of $196,000, ninety percent of which was to be
paid by the NCAA." The NCAA alone appealed the injunction
and the award of attorney's fees."
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the NCAA
was a state actor . 6 The Nevada Supreme Court based its affirm-
ance on a number of factors. First, the court made the assumption
that it was reviewing the imposition of penalties by UNLV and the
NCAA on Tarkanian and not the NCAA's threat of sanction
against UNLV for failing to discipline Tarkanian.4' Second, the
court reasoned that the NCAA's activities constituted state action
because many member schools are public institutions.48 Further,
the court noted that the right to discipline a public employee is
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state and UNLV
could not escape liability by delegating this responsibility to a pri-
vate actor. ' Finally, the court, implementing the two-part test an-
nounced by the Supreme Court of the United States in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co.,50 concluded that Tarkanian's deprivation was
caused by the exercise of a state created right and that because of
UNLV's delegation of authority to the NCAA, UNLV and the
NCAA acted jointly, rendering the NCAA, as well as UNLV, a
state actor.1
III. THE MAJORITY
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the NCAA was not
a state actor when it investigated UNLV and recommended
Tarkanian's suspension." In his opinion for a five Justice majority,
Justice Stevens initially explained the doctrinal setting:
Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a di-
chotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under
the Amendment's Due Process Clause, and private conduct,
against which the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how
unfair that conduct may be.5 1
44. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
45. Id.
46. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 741 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Nev. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct.
1011 (1988).
47. Id. at 1347.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1348.
50. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
51. Tarkanian, 741 P.2d at 1349.
52. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 457 (1988).
53. Id. at 461.
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The primary task for the Tarkanian Court was to determine under
which of these labels the NCAA's conduct would fall. Justice Ste-
vens noted that the Nevada Supreme Court had characterized the
NCAA as a state actor because, the state court held, after UNLV
had delegated to the NCAA its responsibility over personnel deci-
sions, "the two entities acted jointly to deprive Tarkanian of lib-
erty and property interests." 4 However, Justice Stevens rejected
the Nevada Supreme Court's reasoning as "fundamentally miscon-
stru[ing] the facts of this case."8 5 Instead, Justice Stevens con-
tended, the facts make this case atypical, "uniquely mirror[ing] the
traditional state action case."5 Normally, Justice Stevens noted, a
state action issue arises after a private party has engaged in the
decisive conduct which harmed the plaintiff.57 When that is the
case, he continued, the Court is required to ask whether the state
was sufficiently involved with the private actor so that the private
actor's conduct can be characterized as state action. 8 However,
Justice Stevens pointed out, here the decisive con-
duct-Tarkanian's suspension-was committed not by the private
actor but by UNLV, the state actor.5 9 Hence, he concluded, the
issue created by the facts "is not whether UNLV participated to a
critical extent in the NCAA's activities, but whether UNLV's ac-
tions in compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations
turned the NCAA's conduct into state action."60
Having framed the issue, Justice Stevens first examined the
relationship between UNLV and the NCAA regarding the NCAA's
rulemaking procedures." In -doing so, he rejected the contention
that state action could be imputed to the NCAA merely because
UNLV is an NCAA member and, as a member, has had some im-
pact on the formulation of NCAA policy. 2 Observing that hun-
dreds of other member schools also have equal input into NCAA
policymaking, Justice Stevens argued that the legislation adopted
by the NCAA is formulated not by Nevada, but by a collective
membership of both private and public institutions, independent
of any particular state. 3 Thus, he concluded, "[nleither UNLV's
54. Id. at 462.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Justice Stevens, however, does make the distinction between the NCAA which
1989]
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decision to adopt the NCAA's standards nor its minor role in their
formulation is a sufficient reason for concluding that the NCAA
was acting under color of Nevada law when it promulgated stan-
dards governing athlete recruitment, eligibility, and academic
performance. ""4
Next, Justice Stevens rejected Tarkanian's contention that the
entire NCAA investigation and its subsequent recommendations
constituted state action because they were a product of UNLV's
delegation of power to the NCAA. e Although Justice Stevens con-
ceded that a state may transform a private party into a state actor
by delegating authority to that private party, and that UNLV as a
member of the NCAA subscribed to the NCAA bylaw which recog-
nizes that enforcement procedures are an essential component of
each member's programs, he noted that UNLV never delegated
power to the NCAA to take any specific action against any UNLV
employee." Instead, he continued, the "commitment by UNLV to
adhere to NCAA enforcement procedures was enforceable only by
sanctions that the NCAA might impose on UNLV itself."6
Indeed, Justice Stevens noted an adversarial relationship be-
tween UNLV and the NCAA as UNLV's goal throughout the years
of investigation was to retain its successful coach, while the NCAA
primarily wanted to find the truth in its investigation." The na-
ture of this relationship, Justice Stevens argued, militates against
any conclusion that "UNLV's promise to cooperate in the NCAA
enforcement proceedings was tantamount to a partnership agree-
ment or the transfer of certain University powers to the
is comprised of numerous state institutions from different states and those athletic associa-
tions, most obviously on the high school level, whose institutional members are all located in
the same state. Id. at 462 n.13. In the latter scenario, Justice Stevens uninformatively con-
tends, "Itihe situation would, of course, be different .... " Id.
64. Id. at 463.
65. Id. at 463-65.
66. Id. at 464. In fact, Justice Stevens noted:
The NCAA enjoyed no governmental powers to facilitate its investigation. It
had no power to subpoena witnesses, to impose contempt sanctions, or to assert
sovereign authority over any individual. Its greatest authority was to threaten
sanctions against UNLV, with the ultimate sanction being expulsion of the Uni-
versity from membership. Contrary to the premise of the Nevada Supreme
Court's opinion, the NCAA did not-indeed, could not-directly discipline
Tarkanian or any other state university employee.
Id. at 464-65. Further, Justice Stevens rejected Tarkanian's argument that the "NCAA has
assumed the state's traditional and exclusive power to discipline its employees" when he
claimed that Tarkanian's argument "overlooks the fact that the NCAA's own legislation
prohibits it from taking any direct action against Tarkanian." Id. at 465 n.18.
67. Id. at 464.
68. Id.
[Vol. 7:151
8
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 9
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/9
NCAA v. TARKANIAN
NCAA ... .'" Therefore, he concluded, it is improper to charac-
terize the NCAA as an agent of UNLV during the NCAA's investi-
gation of UNLV's basketball program.70 More accurately, he
claimed, the NCAA was an agent of the other members of the
NCAA who had an interest in the enforcement of the NCAA's
rules and regulations: "[T]he NCAA is properly viewed as a private
actor at odds with the State when it represents the interests of its
entire membership in an investigation of one public university."'"
Finally, Justice Stevens rejected Tarkanian's argument that
the NCAA's power was so substantial that UNLV had no choice
but to comply with its demands.72 Justice Stevens reasoned that
even if one were to assume that a monopolist could impose its will
on a state agency by threatening not to-deal with it, "it does not
follow that such a private party is therefore acting under color of
state law." 73
In the end, Justice Stevens noted that the test the Court
enunciated in Lugar provided the relevant inquiry: whether "the
conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [can]
be fairly attributable to the state."'7' Because UNLV and its coun-
sel, including the Attorney General of the State of Nevada, vigor-
ously opposed the NCAA's imposition of sanctions upon UNLV
throughout the proceedings, Justice Stevens reasoned that it would
be "ironic" to conclude that the NCAA's action was fairly attribu-
table to the State of Nevada.78 The more appropriate conclusion,
he said, would be to concede "that UNLV has conducted its ath-
letic program under color of the policies adopted by the
NCAA .... ,,7' That, however, he concluded without saying, does
not make the NCAA a state actor.
IV. THE DISSENT
Justice White filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and O'Connor joined.7 Justice White believed the
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. Cf. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981) (noting that a state-com-
pensated public defender acts in a private capacity when she represents a private client in a
conflict against the state).
72. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
75. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
19891
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central issue to be "whether the NCAA acted jointly with UNLV
in suspending Tarkanian and thereby also became a state actor. '78
He agreed with the majority that the facts of this case-especially
the fact that a party conceded to be a state actor, and not a private
party, committed the final act causing Tarkanian's
harm-distinguish it from the facts of the typical state action case
in which the private party takes the decisive act .7  However, Jus-
tice White explained, this factual scenario is neither unique nor
unprecedented. 0 He argued that in two previous cases-Dennis v.
Sparks and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.a 2-the Court had to de-
cide whether private parties could be labeled state actors where
the final or decisive act causing the alleged harm was undertaken
by a state official. On both occasions, Justice White argued, the
Court held that the private parties would be state actors if they
were "'jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged
action.' 1183
After concluding that Dennis84 and Adickes8" make a search
for joint action the relevant inquiry, Justice White found that the
NCAA acted jointly with UNLV in suspending Tarkanian, giving
three reasons to support his finding. First, he noted that UNLV
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. 449 U.S. 24 (1980). In Dennis, a state trial court judge granted an illegal injunction
to enjoin the production of minerals from oil leases owned by the plaintiff. Id. at 25. The
plaintiff then brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the injunction was a product of a
corrupt conspiracy between the judge and the private parties seeking the injunction and
that it worked to deprive the plaintiff of property without due process of law. Id. at 25-26.
The Supreme Court held that the private parties' involvement in the conspiracy, which in-
volved bribing the judge, constituted state action because the private parties were willful
participants in joint action with a state agent. Id. at 27-28.
82. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). In Adickes, a white school teacher brought suit in federal
court seeking to recover damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged violation of her
constitutional rights. Id. at 146. Adickes' suit resulted from Kress' refusal to serve her lunch
at its Hattiesburg, Mississippi store and Adickes' subsequent arrest by the Hattiesburg Po-
lice on vagrancy charges upon leaving the store. Id. The Court held that Adickes would be
entitled to relief if she could prove that the private party and the involved police officer had
conspired to effect the discrimination and to cause her arrest on impermissible grounds. Id.
at 152. The Court said that this could be shown if proof was presented that the private actor
and police officer had "reached an understanding" regarding the Adickes' arrest. Id. The
Court noted that "a private party involved in such a conspiracy, even though not an official
of the State, can be liable under § 1983." Id. The Court noted that" '[ilt is enough that (the
private partyl is a willful participant in joint activity with the state or its agents....' Id.
(quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
83. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466 (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 24, 27-28).
84. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
85. 398 US. 144 (1970).
86. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466.
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suspended Tarkanian because of Tarkanian's violation of NCAA
rules, rules which bound UNLV contractually pursuant to its
membership agreement with the NCAA.8 7 Second, Justice White
pointed out that the NCAA and UNLV agreed that the NCAA
would conduct the hearings on all alleged rules infractions. 8 In
fact, he noted, the NCAA alone conducted the hearings which the
Nevada Supreme Court found to be violative of Tarkanian's rights
to procedural due process; UNLV was not in control. 8 Finally,
Justice White was persuaded by the membership agreement be-
tween the NCAA and UNLV under which UNLV agreed that the
NCAA's findings made at any hearing the NCAA conducted would
be binding on the university."' He argued that in its capacity as a
member of the NCAA, UNLV did more than merely "promise to
cooperate in the NCAA enforcement proceedings." 9' It agreed, he
claimed, to accept the NCAA's findings of fact as determinative."
As a result, he remarked, UNLV made the decision to suspend
Tarkanian based on the NCAA's findings, even though UNLV con-
sidered many of these findings wrong. 3 "On these facts," Justice
White concluded, "the NCAA was 'jointly engaged with [UNLV]
officials in the challenged action,'" and therefore was a state
actor. 4
After concluding that the facts warranted a finding of joint ac-
tion, Justice White attacked the majority's reasons for not finding
state action in Tarkanian by claiming that they were rejected im-
plicitly in Dennis. 5 Initially, he assailed the majority's reliance on
the NCAA's inability to take action directly against Tarkanian as
being determinative of whether the NCAA was a state actor." He
claimed that in Dennis the private party lacked the power to take
the decisive action against the complainant-in Dennis, the power
to issue an injunction-yet the Court still found state action in
Dennis.7 In addition, Justice White took exception to the major-
ity's claim that UNLV had the ability to disassociate itself from
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 467.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28).
95. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 467.
96. Id.
97. Id.
19891
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the NCAA.98 Again, Justice White noted, a similar situation was
presented in Dennis, where the trial judge could have withdrawn
from his agreement to issue the illegal injunction at any time."
Still, he continued, the Supreme Court found state action in Den-
nis.100 The important factor, Justice White noted, was not the state
entity's ability to withdraw, but that it did not actually
withdraw.101
Finally, Justice White attacked the majority's reliance on the
adverserial nature of the relationship between UNLV and the
NCAA throughout the investigatory process.1 0 2 Although conceding
that UNLV did attempt to avoid the imposition of sanctions by
the NCAA, including Tarkanian's recommended suspension, Jus-
tice White was convinced that UNLV's efforts did not "undercut
the [membership] agreement itself."108 Again, relying on Den-
nis-in which, he posited, the trial judge could have sought to per-
suade the parties that he should not grant the injunction before
ultimately doing so-Justice White claimed that the dispositive
factor was "that ultimately the parties agreed to take the
action. 10 4
Because he believed that "UNLV did suspend Tarkanian, and
[that] it did so because it embraced the NCAA rules governing
conduct of its athletic program and adopted the results of the
hearings conducted by the NCAA concerning Tarkanian, as it had
agreed that it would," Justice White concluded that the NCAA ac-
ted jointly with UNLV, rendering the NCAA a state actor. 08
V. AN ALTERNATIVE REASONING
One theory of state action analysis would find a private party
to be a state actor where the private party and the government are
engaged in a symbiotic relationship.'0 6 In such a relationship,
"multiple or joint contacts," especially if the contacts confer upon
each participant numerous benefits, act to transform the private
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 468.
105. Id.
106. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.4(b) (3rd ed.
1986).
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actor into a government agent.' The classic symbiotic relation-
ship case is Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,0 8 in which
the Supreme Court held that a private restaurant which leased
space in a publicly owned parking facility was a state actor subject
to the constraints of the fourteenth amendment. In Burton, the
Court reasoned that the relationship between the restaurant and
the owner of the parking facility-the government-was such that
each party benefitted from its involvement.109 The restaurant
benefitted in that its location in a public parking facility increased
its business, gave its guests a convenient place to park, and pro-
vided a potential tax exemption."0 Similarly, the restaurant's loca-
tion, aside from bestowing an obvious benefit upon the government
in the form of rental income, also provided the government with
the possibility of increased demand for its parking facilities."'
These mutual benefits, which were indicative of a pervasive inter-
dependence between the state and the private restaurant, led the
Court to find that the restaurant was a state actor.' 2
In reaching his conclusion that the NCAA's conduct did not
constitute state action, Justice Stevens summarily distinguished
Burton."s However, it seems that reliance on Burton could have
allowed the Supreme Court to find the NCAA to be a state actor in
Tarkanian."4 Specifically, Justice Stevens' summary distinction of
Burton ignored the fact that in Tarkanian a relationship of perva-
sive interdependence existed between a government actor and a
private actor so as to constitute the "symbiotic relationship" which
would allow the Court to find that the private party was a state
actor. When looking at the relationship between UNLV and the
NCAA, it is clear that this relationship confers on each "an inci-
dental variety of mutual benefits.""' Consequently, Justice Ste-
vens' statement that in this case "[UNLV] and [the NCAA's] rele-
107. Id.
108. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
109. Id. at 724.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 464 n.16 (1988).
114. Justice Stevens himself admits in Tarkanion that the amount of interdependence
between the two entities is relevant to the ultimate characterization of the private entity as
either a private or a state actor: "The degree to which the activities of the state entity and
the arguably private entity are intertwined also is pertinent." Id. at 463 n.14 (citing Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-26 (1961)) (emphasis added).
115. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 n.16 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Au-
thority, 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961)).
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vant interests do not coincide, as they did in Burton"' 6 is belied
by the nature of the relationship.
Both the NCAA and UNLV benefit from UNLV's membership
in the NCAA. Most importantly, UNLV's participation provides
the NCAA with another nationally recognized, championship-cali-
ber basketball program, whose presence in the association confers
on the NCAA schools who play UNLV a number of benefits: recog-
nition, enhancing the member schools' recruiting efforts; national
exposure, producing television revenues for the member school;
and increased gate revenues, a product of scheduling a national
power like UNLV.
UNLV, meanwhile, benefits in numerous ways as well. First,
UNLV's membership in the NCAA-which has a substantial
framework of rules governing the admissions, recruitment, and eli-
gibility of student athletes, as well as the ability to enforce these
rules-ensures UNLV fair intercollegiate athletic competition.
Further, UNLV's membership in the NCAA facilitates its ob-
taining competition with other members, attracting television reve-
nues and fans. 1" Moreover, membership allows UNLV to partici-
pate in the NCAA's showcase event-the widely acclaimed NCAA
post-season basketball tournament, again providing UNLV with
outstanding exposure and automatic recognition as a successful
program, enhancing recruiting efforts and increasing alumni sup-
port. Finally, membership provides UNLV, as an institution which
seeks to make available to its students a program of intercollegiate
athletics, access to a governing body which facilitates the mainte-
nance of "intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educa-
tional program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body . . ."'18 In fact, as one commentator has noted: "Without
regulation [by the NCAA], the desire of member institutions to re-
main athletically competitive would lead them to engage in activi-
ties that deny amateurism to the public. No single institution
could confidently enforce its own standards since it could not trust
its competitors to do the same."' 9 Therefore, as Justice White has
noted, "[b]y mitigating what appears to be a clear failure of the
free market to serve the ends and goals of higher education, the
NCAA ensures the continued availability of a unique and valuable
116. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 n.16.
117. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99, 103 (1984).
118. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457 (quoting Joint Appendix at 80, Tarkanian (87-
1061)).
119. Note, Antitrust and Nonprofit Entities, 94 HARV. L. REv. 802, 817-18 (1981).
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product .... ",120 Thus, as UNLV undoubtedly seeks to provide its
student body with a program of intercollegiate athletics and, at the
same time, seeks to maintain its commitment to the values of
higher education, its membership in the NCAA provides it with a
mechanism to ensure that it achieves both goals.
Clearly, the NCAA and UNLV both derive benefits from
UNLV's membership in the NCAA. As a result of these benefits
which membership bestows on UNLV, and because the NCAA is in
reality a monopolist, it is impractical to conclude, as Justice Ste-
vens did, that UNLV had viable alternatives to compliance such as
withdrawal.12' Withdrawing from the NCAA would cost UNLV
great sums of revenue, the benefit of high caliber competition, and
the voluminous amount of national exposure the school derives
from its membership in the NCAA. To say UNLV had a choice is
to ignore reality.
In Burton, the Supreme Court noted that private actors whose
relationships with governmental entities place them within the cat-
egory of state actors characterized by a symbiotic relationship only
can be identified by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances."' 22
However, in Tarkanian, if the Court had done a little more sifting
and weighing it would have seen that the relationship between the
NCAA and UNLV is one of mutual interdependence, which war-
ranted a finding of state action pursuant to Burton.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Tarkanian the Court held that the NCAA does not engage
in state action when it investigates a state university's athletic pro-
gram for alleged NCAA violations and requests the university to
show cause why additional sanctions should not be imposed if the
university fails to suspend one of the perpetrators of a rule viola-
tion who happens to be a university employee. Justice Stevens's
majority opinion distinguished Tarkanian from the typical state
action case because in Tarkanian the state, not the private actor,
committed the final act causing the plaintiff's harm. Justice
White's dissent, however, relied on two previous decisions in
which, he claimed, the Court found state action on the part of a
private party who acted jointly with the state, even though the de-
cisive action was taken by the state actor.
120. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 122 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting).
121. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
122. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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There is still no formal test indicating how much contact with
the government will subject a private party's activities to constitu-
tional restrictions. Indeed, according to Burton,2 ' the Court will
continue to determine who is and is not a state actor on a case-by-
case basis by "sifting facts and weighing circumstances. ' 124 Even
so, if the Court had recognized the mutual interdependence of the
NCAA and UNLV and realized that, pursuant to Burton, this in-
terdependence would render the NCAA a state actor, the outcome
would have been different. The Court should have taken a realistic
look at the power of the NCAA and recognized its interdependence
with the state actors which fill its membership rolls.
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